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PROGRAM-State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976),
reaff'd on other grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d

607 (1977).

Frank Leonardis was arrested and indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance. 1 In a separate matter,
Stephen Rose was indicted for both conspiracy to possess and distrib2
ute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of marijuana.
The two alleged offenders independently sought admission to the pretrial intervention program (PTI) of Bergen County.3 Both applications
were summarily rejected pursuant to the established program policy
of excluding applicants charged with the sale of controlled substances
4
as it was considered to be a "heinous offense."
I See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 90, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). Leonardis was allegedly in
24
:21-19(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp.
possession of marijuana in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
1977-1978). 71 N.J. at 90, 363 A.2d at 323. Although the court noted that Leonardis was
arrested for unlawful possession, he was also charged with other related offenses.
2 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 90, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). Rose was charged under the
same statute as Leonardis, as well as under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-24 (West Cum. Supp.
1977-1978). 71 N.J. at 90, 363 A.2d at 323.
3 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 90, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). The Bergen County program, as
well as all other county pretrial intervention programs, is authorized pursuant to New
Jersey Court Rule 3:28. See 71 N.J. at 90, 363 A.2d at 323. The rule requires that each
county obtain the approval of the supreme court before instituting a PTI program. N.J.R.
3:28(a). For a history of the development of Rule 3:28, see note 44-49 infra and accompanying text.
4 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 107, 363 A.2d 321, 333 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). The pertinent section of the
Bergen County PTI project's exclusionary criteria states:
"Persons who come within the following criteria must ordinarily be excluded:
A. Type of Offense:
1. Heinous Offenses: Atrocious Assault and Battery where the victim is seriously injured; Homicide; Mayhem; Forceable Rape; Assault and Battery
on a Police Officer involving injury; Armed Robbery where the victim is
injured; Sale of a Controlled Dangerous Substance. Although these offenses may not prejudice some employers, there is the additional factor of
society's expectation in cases of this nature which may require exclusion."
71 N.J. at 90 n.3, 363 A.2d at 324 n.3 (quoting from Bergen County Probation Depart-
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Subsequently, Leonardis and Rose "filed separate motions for
order[s]" compelling the director of the Bergen County PTI
program to approve their applications. 5 In denying the motions,
which were heard jointly, 6 the court noted that the exclusion from
PTI of those accused of heinous crimes neither denied a fundamental
right nor differentiated among individuals on the basis of a suspect
classification. 7 Defendants then filed motions for leave to appeal
which were denied; 8 however, corresponding petitions to the supreme court were granted. 9
A third petitioner, Frederick John Strychnewicz, indicted in
Hudson County, was charged with "possession of and possession with
intent to distribute hashish. "10 Despite the willingness of the officials
of the Hudson County PTI program to accept Strvchnewicz's application, 1 1 the prosecutor's office refused to consent to the placement, Bergen Countyj Pre-Trial Intervention Project, Exclusion Criteria A(1) (available
from Bergen County Probation Department, Hackensack, N.J.)).
Defendant Rose, a Connecticut resident, was originally rejected by the Bergen
County program because he was not a resident of that county. 71 N.J. at 90 n.2, 363
A.2d at 323 n.2. At the time of the incident, however, he was a boarding student at
Fairleigh Dickinson University in Teaneck, and, on that basis, the trial judge granted a
motion directing a reconsideration of his application for the program. Id. Rose was
then notified of a second denial of admission because he was 'ot
n" qualified.' "' Id.
The practice of automatically excluding out-of-state residents from admission into
New Jersey's PTI programs was declared unconstitutional in State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J.
Super. 528, 538, 358 A.2d 853, 859 (Law Div. 1976). For a discussion of the Nolfi decision, see notes 56-62 infra and accompanying text.
5 State
v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 91, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
6 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 91, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
' See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 91, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). Through an oral opinion, the
lower court judge declined to grant the defendants' petitions stating
"that there is no findamental right to pretrial intervention at all as long as the
eligibility criteria [sic] does not discriminate against what we might call a constitutional protective [sic] class such as one tounded on race or wealth. But the
State need only demonstrate the criteria is [sic] relevant and has basis for
which the classification is made.'"
Id. (brackets in original).
8 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 91, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd onl other grounds
on reheariing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
9 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 91, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds onl rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
io State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). Strychnewicz was indicted
under N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-19(a)(1), -20(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). 71 N.J.
at 92, 363 A.2d at 324.
1 Brief on Behalf of the State of New Jersey at 1, State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360,
375 A.2d 607 (1977).
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ment. l2 The defendant then filed a motion in the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Law Division, seeking an order compelling the prosecutor to furnish a written statement of the reasons for that office's
refusal to allow his placement into PTI.13 The defendant's motion was
granted. 14 In response, the prosecutor petitioned the appellate division for leave to appeal, which was denied.' 5 The New Jersey supreme court, however, ultimately granted a similar petition. 16 Although the three appeals did not concern identical issues, the court
consolidated the Strychnewicz appeal with the pending Rose and
Leonardis cases 17 "to consider . . . certain aspects of the pretrial
intervention programs . . .established in Bergen and Hudson Coun-

ties," and in particular, "the fundamental nature and fairness of
PTI."18
Justice Pashman, writing for a unanimous court, in State v.

Leonardis (Leonardis 1)19 initially noted that the specific issues raised
by the Leonardis and Rose appeals need not be reached in view of
the "fundamental deficiencies ...

inherent in the Bergen County

PTI program. '"20 The court's primary criticism of the Bergen County
program was directed toward the "restrictive impact" which the exclusionary criteria had on admissions. 2 1 According to the court, the at12 See State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). Rule 3:28(b) requires, as a
condition for a defendant's admission to an intervention program, the consent of the
prosecuting attorney. Id.; see notes 45-48 infra.
13 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
14State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
15State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
16 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 92, 363 A.2d 321, 324 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
17State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 89, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
18 State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 89, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (1976), reaff'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
1971 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), reaff'd on other grounds on rehearing, 73 N.J.
360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
20 d. at 110, 363 A.2d at 334. The defendants did not specifically contest the exclusionary criteria, but rather application of these criteria by the Bergen County program. See id. The criteria stipulated that individuals charged with certain offenses were
'ordinarily' " to be excluded. Id. In practice, however, such individuals were "automatically" excluded, without even cursory consideration. Id. Thus, the actual issue
raised by the appeals was "whether [the defendants] respective cases were among those
which 'ordinarily' would have been excluded." Id.
21 Id. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 334-35.
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tendant effect of the criteria was to undermine the overall rehabilitative purpose of PTI. 2 2 Thus, the court invalidated the criteria, holding
that defendants could not be precluded from applying for admission
into a pretrial program based upon exclusionary classifications.

23

In contrast, the issue raised by the Strychnewicz appeal
-whether a prosecutor may decline to articulate his reasons for refusing to consent to a defendant's admission into a PTI program-was

expressly addressed by the court. 24 In an effort "[tlo delimit the exercise of discretion" on the part of the prosecutor, and to assist in

judicial review of PTI decisions, the court concluded that a written
explanation of such prosecutorial decisions is required. 2 5 In addition,
the court held that a defendant is entitled to a judicial hearing at
each stage of PTI where "admission, rejection or continuation" is at
26
issue.
Subsequent to the Leonardis I opinion, the court's action was
challenged as an infringement upon the powers of the executive and
legislative branches of government. 27 The court, in State v. Leonardis
(Leonardis II),28 reaffirmed its original opinion. 29 It held that the
Leonardis I decision could be sustained under both its rule-making and adjudicatory powers, and determined that its actions did not

unduly

infringe upon the

functions of the other governmental

31
branches. 30 Thus, no separation of powers violation existed.
The pretrial intervention concept is essentially the formal enbodiment of heretofore informal diversionary practices within the
criminal justice system. 32 Such diversionary practices are premised

22

Id.

23

Id.at

112, 363 A.2d at 335.

24 See id. at 92, 113-14, 363 A.2d at 324, 326.
25 Id. at 121-22, 363 A.2d at 340-41. An analogous issue was decided in Monks v.

New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). Certification by the
supreme court was granted on the issue of whether a parole board should be required to
provide a statement of reasons for parole denials. Id. at 242, 277 A.2d at 195. The court
concluded that considerations of fairness necessitate a statement of reasons for denials
of parole in order to provide a basis for judicial reexamination. Id. at 246-49, 277 A.2d
at 197-99.
26 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d at 341.
27 State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 367, 375 A.2d 607, 610-11 (1977).
28 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
29 Id. at 384, 375 A.2d at 619.
30 Id. at 375-77, 375 A.2d at 615.
31Id. at 372, 375 A.2d at 613.
32 See, e.g., R. ROVNER-PIECZENIK,
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: AN
EVALUATION

OF POLICY-RELATED

RESEARCH

AND

POLICYMAKER

PERCEPTIONS

2-3

(National Pretrial Intervention Service Center, ABA Commission on Correctional
Facilities and Services, November 1974) [hereinafter cited as PTI STRATEGIES]; Note,
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on the belief that it is not always necessary, and in fact may often be
detrimental, to pursue formal courtroom prosecution for every criminal violation. 33 While diversion was an approved practice within the
criminal justice system, 3 4 the informal mechanisms employed under

Pretrial Intervention Programs-An Innovative Reform of the CriminalJustice System,
28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Innovative Reform];
Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 828 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as PretrialDiversion].
A police officer's initial decision not to arrest a suspect is a common example of
diversion. For a discussion of police diversion, see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration ofJustice,
69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). Diversion also occurs when the prosecutor, acting pursuant to
his authority, terminates a case without prosecution. For a critique of the discretionary
role of the prosecutor, see Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 174 (1965). A more subtle, yet "highly structured" diversionary practice, is
accomplished "by the laws of criminal irresponsibility (insanity pleas)." Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion, Motivation, and Formalization,48
DEN. L.J. 211, 213 (1971). Statutory bases have also been used to incorporate diversion
techniques. For examples of this approach, see F. MILLER, PROSECUTION 272-73 (1970).
33 NATIONAL

GOALS,

COURTS

ADVISORY

COMMISSION

ON

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

STANDARDS

33 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1973) [hereinafter cited as

AND

COURTS];

THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 4 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].

The practice of diverting cases is not novel. Estimates vary, but approximately
"one-third . . . [to] one-half" of all arrest cases are thought to be disposed of in some
nontrial manner by police, prosecutors and judges. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra at 4.
Various factors, such as problems of proof, the availability of alternatives and the taxing
demand on court resources, lie behind use of the diversion process. Brakel, supra note
32, at 216-17.
34See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; Brakel, supra note 32, at
211-12; Goldstein, supra note 32, at 552-54. For an outline of diversion practices, see

note 32 supra. See generally K. DAVIS,

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

(1969).

In an address before the National Conference on Corrections held in 1971, then
Attorney General John Mitchell stated: "In many cases, society can best be served by
diverting the accused to a voluntary community-oriented correctional program instead of
bringing him to trial." Address by John Mitchell, National Conference on Corrections
(1971), reprinted in [1971] 10 CRjM. L. REP. (BNA) 2240.
The initial impetus for acceptance of a diversionary concept can be traced to a
study done by the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
[hereinafter referred to as the President's Commission], which was established in July
of 1965 by executive order of President Johnson. Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R. 329
(1965). One of its principal functions was to:
(1) Inquire into the causes of crime and delinquency, measures for their
prevention, the adequacy of law enforcement and administration of justice, ...
and make such studies, conduct such hearings. . .. as it deems appropriate for
this purpose.
Id. Pursuant to this order, the President's Commission conducted an extensive nationwide
survey which ultimately documented the criminal justice system's inability to reduce
crime. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (U.S. Gov't Printing Office
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1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. The President's Commission made
several recommendations, including the use of diversionary practices. Id. at 133-34. Although the President's Commission did not specifically propose "diversion . .. for the
general offender population," the reasoning employed by the President's Commission
was found to be readily applicable to court-based programs. PTI STRATEGIES, supra
note 32, at 5; see CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra at 133-34.

Endorsement of the diversion concept by numerous sources rapidly followed publication of the President's Commission report. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

AND THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION 84 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS,
THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

FUNCTIONS];

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 73-96 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office 1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS]; COURTS, supra note 33, at 21-41.

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
[hereinafter referred to as the Standards and Goals Commission] made findings similar
to those of the President's Commission. CORRECTIONS, supra at 1, 74-76, 159. According to the Standards and Goals Commission's studies, rehabilitation programs that existed in penal institutions had demonstrated that a person's receptiveness to treatment
while incarcerated did not necessarily guarantee that socially acceptable behavior
would follow once the person returned to the communit,. Id. at 75. In fact, data had
demonstrated "'that prisoners who receive special 'treatment' in [an] institution .. .have
about the same recidivism rates as those who do not." Id. It was therefore theorized that
treatment services would have a more positive impact if the person involved were not
exposed to a prison environment. Id. at 76.
The United States Department of Labor, having experimented with numerous
"manpower," i.e., employment, projects dealing with prisoners and ex-offenders, also
came to the conclusion that because of the debilitating effect of the trial process and
imprisonment, a more positive response to rehabilitation could be obtained by pretrial
diversion. PTI STRATEGIES, supra note 32, at 6-7. In 1967, the Department of Labor
funded two pilot pretrial diversion projects based on its manpower employment
model-the Manhattan Court Employment Project in New York City and Project Crossroads in Washington, D.C. Id. at 8. These pretrial intervention programs attempted to
divert the accused prior to institution of criminal proceedings. Id. at 7. The Department
of Labor projects were provisionally set up on a three year experimental basis. Zaloom,
Pretrial Intervention Under New Jersey Court Rule 3:28, 2 CRIM. JUST. Q. 178, 179-80
(1974). At the end of that time, evaluations were prepared which confirmed many earlier predictions concerning the benefits of pretrial intervention. See PTI STRATEGIES,
su pra at 8. Encouraged by these findings, the Department of Labor and the Law Enforceinent Assistance Administration (LEAA) provided funds for the establishment of
eight additional programs around the country. See id.; Zaloom, supra at 180; Innovative
Reform, supra note 30, at 1208. The cities chosen as project sites were Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Newark, San Antonio, and the California Bay
Area (Hayward, San Jose, Santa Rosa). Id. at 1208 n.34. The reported successes of these
"'Second round' " programs led to the rapid growth of PTI, particularly in urban areas.
Id. at 1208. At present, approximately one hundred similiarly structured programs are in
operation throughout the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands. See NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, ABA COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INTERVENTION TECHNIQUES AND ACTION PROGRAMS (2d ed. June, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as TECHNIQUES AND ACTION PROGRAMS].

In New Jersey, the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (SLEPA), in 1970,
financed this state's first PTI program-the Newark Defendants' Employment Project
(N.D.E.P.). See Zaloom, supra at 182. That same year, the New Jersey supreme court
adopted rule 3:28 entitled "Defendant's Employment Program," which authorized the
use of such programs. N.J.R. 3:28 (1970).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 588

this approach began to engender much criticism. 3 5 Essentially, the
argument advanced was that the absence of procedural safeguards allowed for the arbitrary exercise of official discretion. 36 Accordingly,
recommendations proposed the establishment of formal diversionary
37
programs operating under standardized guidelines.
35 See, e.g., COURTS, supra note 33, at 3; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
The wide range of discretion with regard to "nontrial dispositions" gave rise to criticism
that such unguided discretion created opportunities for improprieties. Id., supra at 4.
Diversion in the form of prosecutorial discretion, for example, has been sharply criticized by Professor Davis. K. DAvIs, supra note 34. at 188-214. He noted that "[t]he
affirmative power to prosecute is enormous, but the negative power to withhold prosecution may be even greater, because it is less protected against abuse." Id. at 188.
Davis observed that the absence of review may lead to such abuse, commenting that
[Jtihe top prosecutors of federal, state, and local governments are typically subject to

little or no checking either by higher officers or by reviewing courts." Id, at 207. He
further indicated that a structuring of the prosecutorial system would protect against
misuse of power and allow for "procedural protections." See id. at 194-98. See also ABA
STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, supra note 34, § 3.4 &
Commentary, at 83-85; LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18
AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 547 (1970).
36 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 34, at 133.

The criticisms of the discretionary power of the prosecutor, made by the President's
Commission, illustrate misgivings concerning unbridled decision-making authority.
While recognizing the value of the discretionary powers of the prosecutor, the
President's Commission cautioned that "prosecutors exercise their discretion under circumstances and in ways that make unwise decisions all too likely." Id. Various deficiencies such as the "lack of [both] sufficient information," and standards and procedures for making prosecutorial decisions, were cited by the President's Commission as
flaws within the discretionary process. Id.; see K. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 196-97;
COURTS, supra note 33, at 2-4; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4. The ABA, in
its commentary on the role of prosecutor, advised: "The prosecutor should establish
standards and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal proceedings should be instituted." ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTIONS, supra note 34, § 3.4(b), at 83.
The use of standards is not intended to be restricted to prosecutors; rather that
office's obligations entail "establish[ing] orderly procedures for the screening of cases
initiated by the police." Id. & Commentary, at 84. The Standards and Goals Commission proposed specific criteria to help law enforcement officials in selecting the
individuals for whom diversion would be most appropriate. COURTS, supra at 17-23.
Among the criteria regarded by that Commission as relevant were the potentially detrimental effects of criminal proceedings on the accused, and the role of the criminal system in protecting the community against future criminal acts. See id. at 20-23. See generally CORRECTIONS, supra note 34, at 76; COURTS, supra at 33, Goldstein, supra note
32, at 544-46.
37 See COURTS, supra note 33, at 2, 30. In commenting upon the need for a formalized structure for the diversion process, the Standards and Goals Commission noted
that
[t]he underlying cause of the problems in diversion programs is that these
programs have developed informally because of inadequate resources to prosecute cases and to treat convicted offenders. These standards seek to alleviate
these conditions and to meet the needs summarized above by encouraging recognition of diversion as an appropriate and legitimate alternative within the
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Increasing court backlogs, substantially due to a rise in crime in
recent decades,3 8 have prompted a formalization of diversionary procedures.3 9 In conjunction with the rising crime rate, the absence of
viable prosecutorial options for dealing with defendants has also con40
tributed to increasingly unmanageable caseloads in trial courts,
which, in turn, hindered "the effective prosecution of more serious
offenses." 4 1 Authorities, cognizant of the need to alleviate overcrowded court calendars, proffered, as a possible solution, pretrial
intervention programs. 4 2 The general format of such programs procriminal justice process. These standards also seek to encourage the development of the most promising programs, and to structure the programs without
depriving them of their flexibility.
Id. at 30; see Goldstein, supra note 32, at 553-54. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note
34, at 196-214.
38It has been posited that the steadily increasing crime rate was the result, in part
of overcriminalization in the system. Overcriminalization is the excessive reliance by
society upon the criminal law to encourage compliance with what is deemed to be
appropriate societal behavior. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 98-99, 106.
Those offenses referred to as "victimless crimes," such as drunkenness, vagrancy and
non-support, are often considered unnecessarily subject to criminal sanctions. See id. at
106-07. Ironically, the inordinate categorization of such types of behavior as criminal, in
order to deter crime, may have had the effect of "interfer[ing] with the operation of the
criminal law and inhibit[ing] the development of solutions to underlying social prob-lems." Id.at 98. Arguably, this overreliance upon criminal law has hindered the effectiveness of courts by significantly increasing the number of cases to be processed. See
PTI STRATEGIES, supra note 32, at 4. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra at 98-99. For a more
detailed discussion of the notion of overcriminalization, see Junker, Criminalization
and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 697 (1972); Skolnick, Criminalization and
Crirninogenesis:A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 715 (1972); Kadish,
More on Overcriininalization:A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719
(1972).
39 See COURTS, supra note 33, at 1-4.
40 PTI STRATEGIES, supra note 32, at 3-4.
41 PTI STRATEGIES, supra note 32, at 4. The flexibility of diversionary procedures
are viewed as beneficial in that, unlike the essentially rigid trial process, they are
adaptable to individual situations. See COURTS, supra note 33, at 28; PTI STRATEGIES,
supra at 4; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The
Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 180, 193 (1975).
42 E.g., COURTS, supra note 33, at 33. There, it was said: "Diversion often occurs
not because of a desire to help the offender or to protect society, but because of the
pragmatic realization that there are not enough resources to pursue formal prosecution."
Id; see id. at 1-3. In addition, similar views have been expressed before Congress:
By selectively diverting certain . . .offenders to voluntary programs of preprosecution probation . . . , many of those accused persons who would otherwise
fall into the "assembly line" system in the courts are effectively diverted,
thereby operating to help un-clog and diminish the criminal caseload dockets of
our courts so that the more serious crimes can be dealt with, such as rape,
murder, consumer fraud, public corruption, and organized crime.
Pre-Trial Diversion: Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
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vides for the suspension of criminal trial proceedings against participating defendants on condition that they participate in certain super4
vised rehabilitative activities.
In 1970, the New Jersey supreme court pioneered in the field of
diversion by sanctioning the pretrial intervention concept for the
state through the promulgation of court rule 3:28. 4 4 The rule, in its
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974) (statement of Robert F. Leonard) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798].
43 See, e.g., COURTS, supra note 33, at 27; Note, Addict Diversion: Ai Alternative
Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEO. L.J. 667, 672 (1972) [hereinafter
referred to as Addict Diversion];Pretrial Diversion, supra note 32, at 827.
Pretrial intervention programs share many common characteristics, yet even within
a particular state, projects may vary substantially. In New Jersey, for example, count%
programs may operate through either the probation department or the Trial Court
Administrator's Office. N.J.R. 3:28(b).
4 See N.J.R. 3:28 (1970). The original rule, entitled "Defendant's Employment
Programs," was adopted for the purpose of authorizing the Newark Defendant's Employment Program. PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, R. 3:28 & Comment. It
was unclear whether non-employment based programs, were eligible for approval under
the rule. SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, reprinted
in 96 N.J.L.J. 449, 462 (1973). Amendments were, therefore, adopted which clarified the
rule, making it applicable to other types of programs such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation. See N.J.R. 3:28(a), (d) (1973). These amendments were as follows:
(a) In counties where a defendant's employment or counseling program or
other diversionary program including a drug or alcoholic detoxification program is approved by the Supreme Court for operation under this rule, the Assignment Judge shall designate a judge or judges to act on all matters pertaining to the program.
(d) Where proceedings have been postponed against a defendant for a second period of 3 months as provided in paragraph (c)(2), at the conclusion of
such additional 3-month period, provided that, in drug detoxification cases the
judge may wait such further period as he deems necessary to enable him to
make an informed decision, the designated judge may not again postpone proceedings but shall make a disposition in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) or (3).
Id. (emphasis added).
That portion of the 1970 rule which provided that a single judge be delegated to act
on PTI matters, has been retained. See N.J.R. 3:28(a). In 1974 the rule was again
amended, vesting the assignment judge with the sole responsibility of handling PTI
matters involving defendants accused of committing heinous crimes. N.J.R. 3:28(a)
(1975). This section reads as follows:
(a) In counties where a pretrial intervention program is approved by the
Supreme Court for operation under this rule, the Assignment Judge shall designate a judge or judges to act on all matters pertaining to the program, with the
exception, however, that the Assignment Judge shall him or herself act on all
such matters involving treason, murder, kidnapping, manslaughter, sodomy,
rape, armed robbery, or sale or dispensing of narcotic drugs by persons not
drug-dependent.
Id. Another 1974 amendment mandates that all statements and admissions made by the
defendant while a pretrial participant, and any program reports, are inadmissible at subsequent hearings. The rule states in pertinent part:
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present form, provides that a recommendation be made by the program director to the judge on behalf of the potential participant, requesting an adjournment of further court proceedings for an initial
three-month period. 4 5 If the postponement is granted, the candidate
is required to engage in community-based services offered through
the program during the three-month interval. 46 At the end of the
initial period, the court must choose one of three options: dismissal of
pending charges, 47 a final three-month adjournment, 4 8 or return of
(4) During the conduct of hearings subsequent to an order returning the
defendant to prosecution in the ordinary course, no program records, investiga-

tive reports, reports made for a court or prosecuting attorney, or statements
made by the defendant to program staff shall be admissible in evidence against
such defendant. No such hearing with respect to such defendant shall be conducted by the designated judge who issued the order returning the defendant
to prosecution in the ordinary course.
N.J.R. 3:28(c)(4) (1975).
The aspects of rule 3:28(c)(4), guaranteeing to an individual confidentiality regarding information obtained by a PTI program, have not been the subject of a legal challenge. However, an analogy can le made to the case of State ex rel. J.P.B., 143 N.J.
Super. 96, 362 A.2d 1183 (App. Div. 1976), wherein the court held that incriminating
statements made by a juvenile during a group counselling session were inadmissable at
a subsequent court proceeding. Id.at 100-07, 362 A.2d at 1186-89. The youth made the
statements while confined at a state institution and was assured at that time that the
statements would remain confidential. Id. at 100-01, 362 A.2d at 1186. The court determined that exclusion of the statements was consistent with fundamental fairness and
due process. Id.at 107, 362 A.2d at 1189.
In conjunction with the confidentiality provision of rule 3:28, rule 1:38 ensures
confidentiality of all pretrial program records by protecting them from public inspection.
N.J.R. 1:38(f). In addition, New Jersey court procedure mandates that criminal defendants initially appearing in municipal courts in counties where intervention programs
exist, must be informed of the existence and the application process for PTI. N.J.R.
3:4-2.
45 N.J.R. 3:28(b) authorizes the following:
(b) Where a defendant charged with a penal or criminal offense has been
accepted by the program, the designated judge may, on the recommendation of
the Trial Court Administrator for the countv, the Chief Probation Officer for the
county, or such other person approved by the Supreme Court as program director, and with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, postpone all further proceedings against said defendant on such charges for a
period not to exceed 3 months.
Id. The consent of the prosecutor is a prerequisite at all stages of PTI. See N.J.R.
3:28(b), (c)(1)(2), (d).
46See N.J.R. 3:28.
47N.J.R. 3:28(c)(1) provides the following:
On recommendation of the program director and with the consent of the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant, dismiss the complaint, indictment or
accusation against the defendant, such a dismissal to be designated "matter
adjusted-complaint (or indictment or accusation) dismissed."
Id.
48 N.J.R. 3:28(c)(2) provides the following:
On recommendation of the program director and with the consent of the
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the accused to the formal trial process. 4 9
Since its inception, there has been a limited amount of litigation

concerning PTI. 5 ° In the case of State v. Nolfi, 5 1 certain aspects
of the Hudson County PTI program, which had been established
pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 3:28, were challenged on equal
prosecuting attorney and the defendant, further postpone all proceedings
against such defendant on such charges for an additional period not to exceed 3
months.
Id. Pursuant to rule 3:28(d), however, drug rehabilitation defendants may be continued
in the program for as long as one year. Id. Section (d) of the rules states:
Where proceedings have been postponed against a defendant for a second
period of 3 months as provided in paragraph (c)(2), at the conclusion of such
additional 3-month period the designated judge may not again postpone proceedings but shall make a disposition in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) or (3),
provided however that in cases involving defendants who are dependent upon
a controlled dangerous substance the designated judge may, upon recommendation of the program director and with the consent of the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant, grant such further postponements as he or she deems necessary to make an informed decision, but the aggregate of postponement periods
under this rule shall in no case exceed one year.
Id.
49 N.J.R. 3: 2 8 (c)(3) provides in pertinent part:
On the written recommendation of the program director or the prosecuting
attorney or on the court's own motion order the prosecution of the defendant to
proceed in the ordinary course.
Id. The offender is entitled to a termination hearing where it is recommended that he
be returned to the regular court process. Id. Section (c)(3) continues:
Where a recommendation for such an order is made by the program director or
the prosecuting attorney, such person shall, before submitting such recommendation to the designated judge, provide the defendant or his or her attorney
with a copy of such recommendation, shall advise the defendant of his or her
opportunity to be heard thereon and the designated judge shall afford the defendant such a hearing.
Id 50 The number of cases dealing with pretrial intervention in New Jersey has been
minimal. State v. Joyner, No. 1127-76, slip op. at 4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 22,
1977) (prosecutor shall be present at rejection hearing); State v. White, 145 N.J. Super.
257, 260, 367 A.2d 469, 471 (Law Div. 1976) (PTI review does not contemplate the
admission of materials or evidence not previously submitted, for such would amount to
"a trial de novo") (italics in original); Irons v. Coleman, No. L-1540-76 P.W., slip op. at
15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (absence of a PTI program in a county not a
denial of equal protection); State v. Kowitski, 145 N.J. Super. 237, 242-43, 367 A.2d 459,
461-62 (Law Div. 1976) (basing availability of PTI solely on the county in which the
crime is committed denies equal protection); State v. Singleton, 143 N.J. Super. 65, 68,
362 A.2d 626, 628 (Law Div. 1976) (" 'essential fairness' " dictates that completion of an
intervention program bars a second proceeding on the same facts); State v. Nolfi, 141
N.J. Super. 528, 536-37, 358 A.2d 853, 857-58 (Law Div. 1976) (denial of admission to a
PTI program solely on the basis of nonresidency held unconstitutional); State v. Rice,
137 N.J. Super. 593, 603, 350 A.2d 95, 101 (Law Div. 1975) (assignment of a defendant
to a pretrial program is not "a 'final determination' " of criminal charges for purposes of
bail forfeiture).
51 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 853 (Law Div. 1976).
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protection grounds. There, a New York resident charged with a disorderly persons offense in Hudson County applied for pretrial
intervention. 52 The accused was summarily denied admission on the
grounds that he did not satisfy the program's residency requirements. 5 3 On appeal, 54 the defendant claimed that the Hudson County
PTI program policy of automatically excluding out-of-state residents
was unconstitutional. 5 5 The defendant argued that summary denial
based on residency violated his right to equal protection, since he
was an eligible applicant in all other respects. 56 He further maintained that a compelling state interest had to be shown to justify his
exclusion because "[t]he fundamental rights [of] preserv[ing] . . . an
untarnished criminal record and the right to avoid incarceration"
57
were involved.
Judge Walsh, in upholding the defendant's equal protection
52 Id. at 533, 358 A.2d at 856. Defendant sought admission into PTI at his initial

municipal court appearance. 1d.
53 Id. Based upon the information before the court, Nolfi was an eligible candidate
for intervention in all respects except residency. See id. at 537, 358 A.2d at 858.
54 New Jersey court rule 3:24 provides that
[e]ither the prosecuting attorney or the defendant may seek leave to appeal to
the county court from an interlocutor' order entered before trial by a court of
limited criminal jurisdiction . . . . The court may . . . elect simultaneously to

grant the motion and decide the appeal on the merits on the papers before it.
Id.
55 141 N.J. Super. at 533-34, 358 A.2d at 856.
56 See id. at 533-34, 537, 358 A.2d at 856, 858. Nolfi further maintained that the
exclusionary criteria were violative of the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution. Id. The court interpreted this clause to read as follows:
[T]hat a state may grant any privilege to its citizens that it sees fit, but those
same rights, privileges and immunities are, by this clause, secured to all citizens of all other states when they come within the borders of that state.
Id. at 538, 358 A.2d at 858. According to the Nolfi court, the privilege involved was the
opportunity to avoid a criminal conviction and its attendant effects. Id. To deny a defendant admission into a PTI program solely on the basis of residency was, therefore,
deemed to be violative of the privileges and immunities clause. Id., 358 A.2d at 859.
57 Id. at 534 n.4, 358 A.2d at 856. This contention was never reached since the court
categorized PTI as a privilege rather than a right. Id. at 534, 536, 358 A.2d at 856-57. In
deeming PTI a privilege, the court was careful to note that such a classification would
not impede an equal protection challenge. Id. at 536, 358 A.2d at 857. But see State v.
Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 390-91, 375 A.2d 607, 622-23 (1977) (Conford, J., temporarily
assigned, concurring) (promulgation of formal rules governing pretrial intervention creates a right to apply for admissions). Another fundamental right which Nolfi could have
asserted is the right to interstate travel. 141 N.J. Super. at 534 n.4, 358 A.2d at 856. The
exclusionary provision, in effect, would compel a defendant seeking entrance into PTI,
to move into a state offering such a program. This possibility gave rise to the tenable
argument that a fundamental right was involved. Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969) (a compelling state interest must be shown in order to constititionally
justify an infringement upon the exercise of one's right to travel).
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claim, looked to "whether the challenged distinction rationally
further[ed] some legitimate, articulated state purpose."5 8 The effect
of the exclusionary provision was to create two intrinsically similar
classes-one consisting of residents, the other of nonresidents. 59 The
court, in rather cursory fashion, found no rational basis for the establishment of the separate classes. 60 Such a classification permitted an
uneven application of the law by discriminating against out-of-state
residents. 6 1 These individuals, though suitable candidates for PTI,
would not be eligible merely because of their nonresident status, 6 2 a
factor having no bearing on their rehabilitative potential. 63 Furthermore, while participation in a pretrial intervention program was not
considered a matter of right, it was, nonetheless, viewed as a signifi-

cant privilege. 6 4 The county's policy was, therefore, "declared null

58 141 N.J. Super. at 536, 358 A.12d at 857. Since a fundamental right was not involved, the classification at issue need only have a rational basis to be constitutionally
valid. See id.; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
59 141 N.J. Super. at 536, 358 A.2d at 857-58.
60 See id. The prosecutor, as representative of the Hudson County PTI program,
claimed that the automatic exclusions were justified, since there had been an increased
number of applications and there existed only limited resources with which to operate
the program. Id. at 535, 358 A.2d at 857. Nolfi took the position that if the program
could not be sufficiently funded to avoid constitutional deficiencies, then it should not
be allowed to operate. Id.
The prosecutor also raised the possible extradition problems which might occur if a
participant did not successfullly complete the program. Id. The court retorted that identical situations occur when out-of-state residents are released on bail; it is simply "a fact
of legal life in criminal proceedings." Id. at 535-36, 358 A.2d at 857. The prosecutor
further contended that difficulties would arise because certain agencies which worked
with the Hudson County program would not accept out-of-state residents. Id. at 535, 358
A.2d at 857. The court implied that the Hudson County PTI program could not sanction
its own procedures by reference to similar practices utilized by other agencies. Id.
61 See id. at 536, 358 A.2d at 857-58. The court, in determining that the distinction
was discriminatory, noted that " '[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense * * * it has made as an invidi-

ous a discrimination as if it had selected a particular [group] for oppressive treatment.' "
Id. at 536, 358 A.2d at 858 (quoting from Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
62 See 141 N.J. Super. at 536-37, 358 A.2d at 857-58. Although there is no information in the opinion concerning the defendant's background, the court stated that Nolfi
was an appropriate person for diversion. See id. at 537, 358 A.2d at 858. Judge Walsh
commented that the defendant was likely to be rehabilitated and therefore came within
the ambit of PTI's purpose. Id.
6- See id. at 536-37, 358 A.2d at 857-58.
6 See id. The notion of privilege differs from that of a right. One court has stated:
There is inherent in the very word " 'privilege' " the idea of something
apart and distinct from a common right which pertains to all citizens or exists in
all subjects. It connotes some sort of a special grant from sovereignty, some
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and void," with the result that PTI would have to be made available
65
to eligible out-of-state residents.
Leonardis I is the first New Jersey supreme court case to consider the validity of exclusionary practices arising under rule 3:28.66
Prior to its examination of such practices, however, the court addressed the threshold jurisdictional question of its authority to hear
an appeal arising from a denial of admission into an intervention
program.6 7 The state argued that courts, in general, lacked jurisdiction to review determinations made under rule 3:28 since there was
no express provision in the rule for appellate review. 6 8 Speaking for
the court, Justice Pashman rejected the state's contention, noting that
rule 3:28 was promulgated pursuant to the supreme court's constitutional power to adopt rules concerning both the administration and
the procedure of the New Jersey courts. 69 Relying upon former Chief
Justice Weintraub's statement that " 'the power to make rules imports the power to enforce them,' "70 the court reasoned that its
"rule-making authority" included the power of review in the present
matter, despite the absence of any express right of appeal in rule
3:28.71
type of necessary special permission or consent which the sovereign in its discretion might have withheld or failed to provide.
State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S.D. 593, 618, 251 N.W. 189, 200 (1933). However,
constitutional guarantees are not based upon the classification of a governmental entitlement as a "right" or a "privilege." See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(state is restrained from suspending driving privileges without procedural clue process);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (fact that welfare benefits are a statutory
privilege, and not a right, will not defeat constitutional challenge).
65 141 N.J. Super. at 536-38, 358 A.2d at 857-59.
66 71 N.J. at 106-07, 363 A.2d at 332. For other cases dealing with various aspects of
diversion, see note 50 s ira.
67 71 N.J. at 108, 363 A.2d at 333.
6 Id. at 107-08, 363 A.2d at 333. Although rule 3:28(c)(3) provides for a hearing
after the initial three-month period if prosecution is recommended, the state argued that
such hearings could not be considered appellate review. 71 N.J. at 108, 363 A.2d at 333.
The prosecutor contended that this procedure was required only where candidates initially met the eligibility criteria but were later rejected by the program director or prosecutor. Id.The matters of Leonardis and Rose were distinguishable, in that both defendants failed to neet even the basic prerequisites for entry into a PTI program. Id.
69 Id. For a discussion of the court's rule-making power, see note 118 infra and accompanying text.
70 71 N.J. at 109, 363 A.2d at 334 (quoting from In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 272, 168
A.2d 38, 45 (1961)).
7i 71 N.J. at 108-09, 363 A.2d at 333. Despite the general proposition that due process does not require appellate review for criminal cases, a review was deemed appropriate. Id. at 108, 363 A.2d at 333; see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The
court pointed out that the interpretation of a court rule, not a statute, was at issue. 71
N.J. at 108, 363 A.2d at 333.
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Prefatory to resolution of the jurisdictional question, the court
found it necessary to examine the development of pretrial intervention, focusing on the basic premises of the concept. 72 As a result of
this examination, Justice Pashman concluded that there existed two
general purposes common to PTI programs. 73 In the court's view,
the primary purpose of PTI is to rehabilitate the offender. 74 The
"expeditious disposition" of criminal cases, 75 although a welcome
'collateral benefit' " of the diversionary process, 76 was deemed to be
77
a secondary and subordinate goal.
In view of the major underlying purpose of PTI, the court determined whether or not the program procedures challenged by the
Leonardis I appeals furthered this goal. The court noted that the eligibility criteria for PTI programs should be sufficiently flexible to divert
the optimum number of cases.78 At the same time, a degree of selectivity, designed to admit only "those . . . who have the best prospects for rehabilitation," should be maintained.7 9 Thus, the summary
exclusion of defendants charged with a heinous offense 8 ° was found to
72 71 N.J. at 92-107, 363 A.2d at 324-32.
73 See id. at 96-97, 363 A.2d at 326-27. For an explanation of the development of
pretrial intervention, see notes 32-49 supra and accompanying text.
74 71 N.J. at 96, 363 A.2d at 326-27; see Addict Diversion, supra note 43, at 673.
75 71 N.J. at 96, 363 A.2d at 327.
76 Id. at 98 n.8, 363 A.2d at 328.
77 Id. at 96-100, 363 A.2d at 326-29. The belief that the rehabilitative purpose of
PTI is superior to the facilitation of court processing is, perhaps, not as conclusive as
the Leonardis court suggests. In the case of State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 532, 358
A.2d 853, 855 (Law Div. 1976), discussed at notes 53-62 supra and accompanying text,
it was stated that rehabilitation and efficient court procedure were equally important
goals of PTI. See generally Innovative Reform, supra note 32, at 1204; Pretrial
Diversion, supra note 32, at 827.
78 71 N.J. at 100-02, 363 A.2d at 329-30.
79 Id. at 100, 363 A.2d at 329. Justice Pashman recommended that an "individualistic approach" be taken when selecting participants for PTI. Id. at 100-01, 363 A.2d
at 329. This type of approach has been applied at the sentencing level, and it has been
suggested that it "is equally appropriate at the charging stage." LaFave, supra note 35,
at 534. Professor LaFave has noted that there are situations where prosecution may not
be desirable. These occur, for example, when the nature of the violation does not outweigh the excessive cost of trial, or when the harm done is not particularly serious and
may be corrected. Id. at 534-35; see F. Miller, supra note 32, at 260-80; Goldstein,
supra note 32, at 549.
80 71 N.J. at 110-11, 363 A.2d at 334-35. The practice of restricting diversionary
alternatives to certain categories of offenders is not unusual. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2906 (1970) (narcotics addicts, if not charged with a violent crime or dispensing
of drugs, and having no more than two prior felony convictions); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19-484 (West 1969) (limited to "drug-dependent person[s]"); Dangerous Drug
Abuse Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91-1/2, §§ 120.1-13 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Ann. Pocket Part
1977) (narcotics addicts charged with non-violent offenses who have no more than two
prior convictions of a violent crime); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276A, §§ 1-9 (Michie/Law.
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"accord misplaced emphasis to the offense," thereby thwarting the
81
rehabilitation function upon which PTI is premised.
Justice Pashman observed that in the rejections of Rose and
Leonardis, no attempts were made to ascertain any factors pertinent
to their rehabilitative potential.8 2 The trial judge was unaware, at
the time he reviewed the defendants' applications, that Leonardis was
fully employed and had never been involved with the criminal court
system, or that Rose was a full-time student. 8 3 Such factors, germane
to a defendant's rehabilitative prospects, would necessarily be overlooked if PTI programs were allowed to rely exclusively on the nature
of the alleged offense in determining admissions. 8 4 Consequently, the
court held that the categorical denial of admission into a program
based upon the mandatory application of exclusionary criteria could
not be countenanced, for such a procedure failed to take account of
85
the rehabilitative aims of pretrial programs.
Consideration was then given to the remaining issue, namely,
whether a prosecutor may refuse to particularize his reasons for failing to consent to a defendant's request for admission into a PTI

program. 86 The court determined that to require the prosecutor to
record his reasons for pretrial denials was consistent with the re87
habilitative goals of PTI, and "further[ed] their implementation.-

Co-op 1977 Cur. Supp.) (participants must be between ages of seventeen and twentyone exclusive, without a prior criminal record or pending criminal cases); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.95A.010-.900 (1976 Pocket Part) (excludes misdemeanor offenses); PA.
R. CluiM. P. 175 to 185 (non-violent offenders).
8171 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335. The notion of concentrating on the individual
involved, rather than on the crime committed, had been advanced previously. During
his tenure as chairman-6f the ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Richard J. Hughes, observed that
"diversion of the 'offender' rather than the offense charged emphasizes individual needs
as the determining factor in participant eligibility." The Community Supervision and
Services Act: Hearings on S. 798 Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiariesof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1973) (statement of Richard J.
Hughes) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 798].
82 71 N.J. at 111-12, 363 A.2d at 335. The practice of not providing pertinent background information about defendants was disturbing to the court, and was considered
one of the deficiencies in the Bergen County program. See id.
831d. at 111, 363 A.2d at 335. The court suggested that the following criteria be
given consideration in assessing an applicant's rehabilitative potential: "the defendant's
willingness to avoid conviction . . . , the motivation behind the commission of the
crime, the age and past criminal record of the defendant and his current rehabilitative
efforts." Id. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335. These factors were subsequently incorporated in
the PTI guidelines by the court. See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
84 See 71 N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335.
85Id. at 111-13, 363 A.2d at 334-36.
8
6 Id. at 92, 113-14, 363 A.2d at 324, 336.
87 Id. at 114, 363 A.2d at 336. In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the
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Furthermore, this requirement would have a significant effect on a
defendant's ability to challenge a denial of admission into a program,
since the Leonardis I court granted defendants the right to a hearing
in the event of such a denial.8 8 In addition, the availability of a record
would facilitate judicial review of PTI admission procedures, as well
as provide a source of information for evaluating an "essentially ex89
perimental" program.
The issues presented by the Leonardis I appeals evidenced the
deficiencies in the Bergen and Hudson county programs. The court
noted, however, that such defects were not unique to the two counties, but rather existed in programs throughout the state.9 0 The court

found that the diversity of the programs and the lack of review of
prosecutorial discretion were the major causes of' the problems in
New Jersey's PTI programs. 9 1 In order to resolve these shortcomings,

92
the court recommended adoption of a uniform statewide system.
conclusion of the Standards and Goals Commission which reported that:
If diversion programs are to perform as they are intended, then the decisions of those referring to these programs must be subject to review and evaluation....
The first step in establishing accountability is to disclose the basis of decisions. Too often the rationale for discretionary decisions is undisclosed and unstated. Simply requiring written statements for each decision forces the process
to become more open while it also permits administrative or judicial review.
Review can be through the courts, the legislature, or whatever source seems
most appropriate in seeing that goals have been achieved and standards complied with.
CORRECTIONS, supra note 34, at 96.
It should be noted that under certain circumstances, the prosecutor may not be
required to submit reasons for a PTI denial. 71 N.J. at 119, 363 A.2d at 339. When a
prosecutor believes that there is good cause for withholding certain sensitive information,
he may request an in camera hearing. Id. The prosecutor must then present evidence
demonstrating the prejudicial nature of the information, leaving the judge to determine
whether the state's justification for witholding the data outweighs the defendant's need
for a statement of reasons. Id.
88 See 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d at 341. In granting defendants the right to a hearing
if denied admission to PTI, the court reasoned that inclusive in its power to enforce
court rules is "the power to review decisions made pursuant to those rules." id. at 114,
363 A.2d at 336. See generally id. at 108-09, 363 A.2d at 333-34; notes 107, 118 infra.
89 71 N.J. at 114-15, 363 A.2d at 336. Although the court recognized the novelty of
the PTI concept, it commented that the notion has been firmly established in New
Jersey. Id. at 114, 363 A.2d at 336. Notwithstanding the fact that PTI is well founded in
this state, the court acknowledged the value of "experimentation, evaluation, assessment
and modification of programs." Id. Justice Pashman was also carefil to note that, given
the experimental status of PTI programs, shortcomings in projects were to be expected.
Id. at 120, 363 A.2d at 339. For a narration of the general history of PTI and its development in New Jersey, see notes 33-35 supra.
9071 N.J. at 110-11, 363 A.2d at 334.
91 Id. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 339-40.
92 See id.
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Pursuant to this objective, the court, subsequent to its decision in
Leonardis 1, issued guidelines which set forth procedures to be followed by PTI programs within the state. 9 3 These guidelines explicate
94
further the conclusions reached by the Leonardis I court.
Under the guidelines, an individual's eligibility for pretrial intervention is based primarily upon his "amenability to the rehabilitative
95
process," rather than upon the offense with which he is charged.
This does not imply, however, that the offense is to be viewed in a
cursory manner. Where the crime charged involves any of the following: organized criminal activity, continued criminal enterprise, violence against another individual, or breach of public trust, admission
to PTI "should generally be rejected. "96 There must also be "an apparent causal connection between the offense charged and the
[defendant's] rehabilitative need"; 97 however, the court does not pro-

93 ORDER IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION OF PRETRIAL INTERVEN-

TION IN NEW JERSEY (Sept. 8, 1976), reprinted in 99 N.J.L.J. 865 (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as PTI GUIDELINES]. The preliminary guidelines issued in Leonardis I,
were, in fact, mandatory modifications for programs presently in existence. 71 N.J. at
121, 363 A.2d at 340. These standards were incorporated into the court's PTI
Guidelines.
94 Compare 71 N.J. at 121-22, 363 A.2d at 340-41, with PTI GUIDELINES, supra
note 93, Guidelines 2,3(i), 8. Although the guidelines are in substantial agreement with
the Leonardis I holding that PTI programs should be available to all offenders regardless of the offense charged, nevertheless, guideline 3(d) does allow f'or the automatic
exclusion of individuals "charged with ordinance, health code and other similar violations." PTI GUIDELINES, supra, Guideline 3(d).

95PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guidelines 2, 3(i); see 71 N.J. at 112, 122, 363
A.2d at 335, 340.
The idea of "amenability to correction" appears to be synonymous with the "whol&
person" concept, used as a sentencing technique. 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d at 840; State
v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 566-67, 303 A.2d 312, 322-23 (1973). The "whole person" theory
is premised on the court obtaining a complete informational background on the defendant prior to disposition. See 62 N.J. at 566-67, 303 A.2d at 322-23. Compare id. with 71
N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335.
96PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guideline 3(i). Apparently, there is a rebuttable
presumption that defendants accused of these offenses are unsuitable for PTI. Such
individuals, however, are not precluded from consideration, and may present relevant
information concerning their possible admission. Id. For discussion of the court's interpretation of guideline 3(i), see note 95 supra.
97PTI GUIDELINES, "ipra note 93, Guideline 1(a). PTI Guideline l(a) states the
purposes of PTI, the primary purpose being
[t]o provide defendants with opportunities to avoid ordinary prosecution by
receiving early rehabilitative services, when such services can reasonablv be
expected to deter future criminal behavior by the defendant, and when there is
an apparent causal connection between the offense charged and the rehahilitative need, without which cause both the alleged offense and the need to prosecute might not have occurred.
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vide any insight as to how program personnel or courts are to make
98
such specific determinations.
In the event of a denial of admission into a PTI program, a defendant has the opportunity to contest this determination by "demonstrating his amenability to the rehabilitative process." 9 9 As provided
by Leonardis I, the defendant is to receive a written statement of
the reasons for non-acceptance and is entitled to an informal hearing
on the matter. 10 0 According to the court's directive, the offender, at
that hearing, must demonstrate that the denial was "arbitrary or
capricious."' 1 1 In addition, he also bears the burden of showing that
the decision rejecting his application constituted an abuse of
discretion. 102
Simultaneously with the promulgation of these guidelines, the
court granted a motion by the attorney general for a rehearing on
03
certain issues arising as a consequence of the Leonardis I opinion.1
98 PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guideline 2. The guidelines mandate that certain factors such as age, residence, jurisdiction, and prior record of convictions, be considered. Id. Guideline 3(a)-(c), (e). It is also suggested that, where it is likely that a
disposition of minimal effects will result, the defendant should not be diverted. Id.
Guideline 3(d). The criteria additionally provide that "defendants who demonstrate sufficient effort to effect necessary behavioral change and show that future criminal behavior will not occur" are eligible. Id. Guideline 2. The practicability of so amorphous a
guideline, however, is questionable, since program personnel and lawyers alike will
find it extremely difficult to guarantee the behavioral change of an individual.
99 Id. Guideline 2.
100 Id. Guideline 8; see 71 N.J. at 119, 122, 363 A.2d at 339, 341.
101 PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guideline 8.
102PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guidelines 2, 3(i), 8. The placing of such an
onerous burden on the defendant indicates that the court intended such reviews only in
unusual situations. This position finds support in the second Leonardis opinion. There,
the court stressed that decisions of prosecutors in PTI matters should be viewed with
deference, and should only be overruled in extreme circumstances. 73 N.J. 360, 381,
384, 375 A.2d 607, 619 (1977); see State v. Joyner, No. 1127-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div., Feb. 22, 1977) (prosecutor shall be present at rejection hearing); State v. White,
145 N.J. Super. 257, 260-61, 367 A.2d 469, 471 (Law Div. 1976) (PTI review does not
contemplate the admission of materials or evidence not previously submitted, for such
would amount to a "trial de novo") (italics in original).
10373 N.J. 360, 366-67, 375 A.2d 607, 610-11 (1977). Leonardis I was decided on
July 21, 1976. 71 N.J. at 85, 363 A.2d at 321. At that time defendants' appeals, requesting reexamination of their applications, were reversed and remanded for reconsideration
consistent with the court's modifications. Id. at 122, 363 A.2d at 341. On August 24,
1976, the attorney general moved not only to intervene as amicus curiae, but also to
allow the filing of a petition for clarification beyond the normal time period and for a
stay of judgment. Brief and Appendix on Rehearing on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at
1, State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant]. In an order dated September 8, 1976, the supreme court granted leave to
intervene and consented to a rehearing on the limited issues stated in its order. Order,

1977]

NOTES

The challenge to the Leonardis I holding concerned the question of
whether, in view of the separation of powers doctrine, the court was
empowered to divert a defendant over an objection from the
prosecutor's office.10 4 In order to properly resolve the question
raised, the court determined that it was necessary to examine the
constitutionality of rule 3:28.105

The adoption of PTI in New Jersey via court rule was questioned
as being an encroachment upon the executive and legislative branches,
since the rule affected substantive as well as procedural areas of the
law.'l6 The rule-making power of the court is limited to "practice and
procedure"; 10

7

as such, the procedural aspects of PTI, allowing for

the expeditious disposition of cases, were found to be clearly within
the court's power.' l 8 However, it had been contended that because
of the rehabilitative purposes of PTI, rule 3:28 affected not only court
State v. Leonardis, No. M-1234 (Sup. Ct., filed Sept. 8, 1976). The issues reserved for
rehearing were:
1. The power of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its adjudicative
function, to declare the authority of the Courts of this State to divert a criminal
proceeding, after a hearing, without the consent of the prosecutor, in the light
of the doctrine of separation of powers;
2. The power of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule making
power, to declare the authority of the courts of this State to divert a criminal
proceeding without the consent of the prosecutor;
3. In respect of both of the foregoing, whether there is any distinction between proceedings post-indictment and pre-indictment.
Id.
On that same day, the court outlined specific guidelines for the operation of PTI
programs, to be applied on a statewide basis. These were in addition to those set forth
in the Leonardis I opinion. See notes 93-102 .supra and accompanying text. Also intervening as amici curiae were the Passaic County Prosecutor and the Honorable Ervan F.
Kushner, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Paterson. 73 N.J. at 367, 375 A.2d at
611. Oral arguments were presented to the court on November 8, 1976. Id. at 360, 375
A.2d at 607. The resulting opinion, written by Justice Pashman, was decided on May 31,
1977. See id. For an analysis of the court's decision, see notes 118-20, 125 infra and
accompanying text.
104 73 N.J. at 366-67, 375 A.2d at 610-11. For an outline of the specific issues argued on rehearing, see note 103 supra.
105 73 N.J. at 367, 375 A.2d at 611.
106 See id. at 369-70, 375 A.2d at 612.
107 See id. at 368, 375 A.2d at 611.
The court's rule-making power derives from article VI, section 2, of the New Jersey
consitution. The section provides in pertinent part:
3. The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all
courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts.
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3. For an interpretation of the grant of authority, see note
118 infra.
10873 N.J. at 368, 375 A.2d at 611.
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procedure, hut also concerned areas traditionally left to the
legislature.109 The court recognized, however, that the functions of
the three branches of government were not so compartmentalized
that there was no overlapping of authority.1 10 As long as the
"'essential integrity' "I1" of each remained unimpaired, the
actions

of any one branch would not be considered an unconstitutional infi-ingement upon the others.112 Therefore, despite the fact that rule
3:28 may have an impact on substantive rights, the court concluded
that there had not been interference with the other governmental
branches to the extent of constituting a violation of the separation of

powers doctrine. 113
The Leonardis II court then addressed itself to the issue of
whether, in light of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary
could review prosecutorial denials of admissions into pretrial
prograns. 114 On this question the attorney general contended that
the requirement of judicial review of prosecutorial PTI determinations, as mandated in Leon ardis 1, went beyond the court's rulemaking power and was an encroachment upon the functions of the

executive branch. 115 This contention was founded upon the premise
109 Id. at 369-70, 375 A.2d at 611-12. An example of pretrial legislation is a proposed bill entitled The Prosecutive Discretion Act introduced in the New Jersey legislature and forwarded to the Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee of
the New Jersey Assembly where it is no\\, under consideration. N.J. Assembly Bill No.
1648 at 1, 3 (introduced Mar. 3, 1976); see 64 N.J. Legis. Index A42 (June 27, 1977). The
bill proposes "to enable County Prosecutors to employ a system of pre-trial diversion in
cases involving certain selected first time offenders." N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1648,
Statement, at 3.
11073 N.J. at 370, 375 A.2d at 612. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (President does not have the power to seize property to settle labor disputes, the law-making power sought having been delegated to
Congress).
M 73 N.J. at 372, 375 A.2d at 613 (quoting from Massett Building Co. v. Bennett, 4
N.J. 53, 57, 71 A.2d 327, 329 (1950)).
112 73 N.J. at 372, 375 A.2d at 613.
113 Id. The Leonardis II court pointed out further that PTI is a remedy in the criminal process, and that the judiciary is empowered to fashion such remedies. 1d. at
369-70, 375 A.2d at 612; see State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 392, 316 A.2d 449, 455 (1974).
114 See 73 N.J. at 375, 375 A.2d at 615.
115 Brief on Behalf of the State of New Jersey Amicus Curiae at 4, State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Anicus Curiae].
The court in Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957), careful]\ examined
the nexus between the executive branch and the count\, prosecutor's office. There, the
prosecutor was described simply as "a local official.' Id. at 373, 132 A.2d at 19. On that
basis, it was posited that the prosecutor was not in a position to advance any separation
of powers claims. Id. at 372-73, 132 A.2d at 19; see Brief for Appellant, supra note 103,
at 7 n.5, 8. This contention, however, has been largely dissipated by passage of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1970, 1970 N.J. Laws ch. 74, at 275 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
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that the executive branch is fundamentally responsible for determining which cases should be subject to prosecution. 116 Any interference
with this function by the courts would constitute an infringement
upon the separation of powers doctrine, unless evidence were made
available which demonstrated that there had been "an oppressive and
manifest abuse of office" on the part of a government official. 117 The
court rejected the attorney general's contention and reaffirmed its decision in Leonardis I, holding that the authority for diversion existed
pursuant to both the court's adjudicatory function and its rule-making
powers.18 Therefore, the court found that the doctrine of separation
of powers had not been violated in this instance.119
Reiterating the position taken by the court in Leonardis 1, Justice Pashman noted that the decision to divert a defendant from criminal prosecution represents a " 'quasi-judicial' " function.120 Such a
§§ 52:17B-97 to -117 (West 1970)). See In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood Fact
Finding Comm., 65 N.J. 512, 528, 324 A.2d 1, 10 (1974). This Act substantiall, alters the
relationship between the attorney general and county prosecutors by delegating to the
attorney general more direct responsibility in the supervision of county prosecutors. N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52:17B-103 to -107 (West 1970). As a consequence, the county prosecutor
can no longer be considered purely a "local official." See id. 65 N.J. at 528-29, 324 A.2d
at 10.
116 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 115, at 4.

117 Id.
118 73 N.J. at 375-76, 375 A.2d at 615.
The court's rule-making power has been evaluated in light of the doctrine of separation of powers. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 71 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
877 (1950), is a leading case interpreting the rule-making provision of the New Jersey
constitution. In that case, Chief Justice Vanderbilt framed this power in the context of
procedural law. He stated:
the rule-making power as to practice and procedure must not invade the field of
the substantive law as such. While the courts necessarily make new substantive
law through the decision of specific cases coming before them, they are not to
make substantive laws wholesale through the exercise of the rule-making power.
5 N.J. at 248, 74 A.2d at 410. The distinction between procedural and substantive law,
however, has not been clearly defined. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d
571, 578 (1973). Yet despite such ambiguity, it is generally conceded that a rule of
procedure may affect substantive law and still be considered a valid exercise of the
court's rule-making power. Id.
119 73 N.J. at 369-75, 375 A.2d at 611-14; cf. People v. Superior Court of San Mateo,
11 Cal. 3d 59, 66, 520 P.2d 405, 409-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25-26 (1974) (decisions to
divert defendants into pretrial programs not part of prosecutorial charging function). But
cf. Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 76, 520 P.2d 412, 416, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 28, 32 (1976) (district attorney's authority to preliminarily determine pretrial intervention eligibility valid, since not within scope of judiciary).
120 73 N.J. at 378-79, 375 A.2d at 616 (quoting from State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. at
115, 363 A.2d at 337). The court's description of PTI as a quasi-judicial function, is
couched in terms indicating a belief that diversion is outside the scope of the
prosecutor's charging function, 73 N.J. at 378-79, :375 A.2d at 616-17.
"It is one thing not to charge and let the accused go totally free, but it may be
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characterization of PTI obviates any controversy that the overruling of
a prosecutor's decision to deny admission into a program violates the
separation of powers doctrine.'12 However, assuming arguendo that
diversion decisions are not quasi-judicial functions, the majority
nevertheless determined that its power to enforce court rules includes the power to divert a defendant into a PTI program despite
prosecutorial objection.1 22 This stance was somewhat qualified by the
court's statement that it would not exercise such discretion in the
absence of actions evidencing a clear failure to adhere to statewide
guidelines.' 2 3 In fact, Justice Pashman commented that "[j ]udicial review should be available to check only the most egregious examples
of injustice and unfairness.' 1 24 Furthermore, Justice Pashman noted
that the judiciary's traditional role of protecting "individuals from
abusive governmental action" necessitated a finding that the court's
adjudicatory powers included the authority to conduct such re-

quite another to withhold a charge, and hence not to invoke the jurisdiction of
the court system, on condition that an uncharged, untried, unconvicted person
submit to a correctional program."
Id. at 379, 375 A.2d at 617. See People v. Fusco, 85 Misc. 2d 147, 154, 378 N.Y.S.2d 902,
908 (Nassau County Ct. 1975) (referrals to diversionary programs are judicial acts similar
to sentencing); People v. Superior Court of San Mateo, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 65, 520 P.2d 405,
410, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 26 (1974) (once decision to prosecute is made, "case is 'before
the court' for disposition").
121 73 N.J. at 376, 375 A.2d at 615.
Professor Freed has observed that PTI procedures are essentially "judicial decisions prescribing controls over future conduct, rather than . . .prosecutorial decisions
regarding whether to charge a person with a criminal offense, or to prosecute or nolle a
case after the charge or indictment has been filed." Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798,
supra note 42, at 151 (statement of Daniel J. Freed). In his estimation, diversion "constitutes a pretrial sentence," since the person involved is arrested and agrees to certain
restrictions without contesting the charge. Id. In addition, there exists a possibility that
the individual may be prosecuted in the future if he does not satisfactorily comply with
PTI regulations. Id. Consequently, Professor Freed considers it inappropriate for pretrial diversion to be completely under the auspices of the prosecutor where it could
develop into "diversion bargaining." Id. at 152. A "diversion bargaining" system places
"both the prosecut[oriall and sentencing functions on the prosecutor." Id. The prosecutor would be empowered to place restrictions on a defendant without having to persuade a court of the individual's guilt or of the necessity of placing such restrictions on
the individual. See id.; Comment, supra note 41, at 201.
The Fifth Circuit has determined that judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is
violative of the separation of powers doctrine. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
122 73 N.J. at 375, 375 A.2d at 615.
123 Id.
The court's position regarding prosecutorial review is not limited to denials
of pretrial intervention; it is also applicable where a defendant's admission into a program is improper. Id.
1
24 Id. at 384, 375 A.2d at 619.
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views. 1 25 This authority does not constitute a violation of separation
of powers, as its exercise is premised solely upon "a showing of patent and gross abuse" of prosecutorial discretion.121
Having resolved the jurisdictional challenges to Leonardis I, the
125 Id.

at 376, 375 A.2d at 615. The notion of protecting individuals from abuses of

discretion has had its primary application in actions involving administrative agencies.
Appellate review has been extended to numerous types of administrative agency decisions. See, e.g., Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 246-48, 277 A.2d
193, 197-98 (1971) (state parole board required to give statement of reasons for parole
denials); Borough of Fanwood v. Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 414-15, 165 A.2d 183, 188-89
(1960) (judicial review of municipal liquor licensing practices); Abbotts Dairies, Inc. v.
Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 332-33, 102 A.2d 372, 379 (1954) (milk price-fixing orders subject to judicial review). See generally 2 K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE

§ 16.05 (1958).
Prosecutorial decision-making is also not immune from judicial review by virtue of
the separation of powers doctrine. See 73 N.J. at 377, 375 A.2d at 616. In fact, the very
purpose of the doctrine is to insure against just such unchecked power. This is particularly relevant to the area of PTI, where the Leonardis I court expressed concern over
"the virtually untrammeled discretion .. .vested in prosecutors associated with the PTI
programs." 71 N.J. at 121, 363 A.2d at 340. See In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood
Fact Finding Comm., 65 N.J. 512, 515-16, 324 A.2d 1, 2-3 (1974) (prosecutor's decision
not to discontinue proceedings involving election law violation held subject to court
review).
12673 N.J. at 376, 375 A.2d at 615. In a concurring opinion, Judge Conford outlined
a different basis for concluding that there was no separation of powers violation. Id. at
384, 375 A.2d at 619 (Conford, J., concurring). He suggested that the majority had not
confronted the specific issue reserved for consideration, namely, whether the decision
to divert a defendant is a judicial responsibility or a function of the executive branch.
Id. at 386, 375 A.2d at 620. Judge Conford analyzed the court's authority to review
prosecutorial decisions in terms of the prosecutorial charging function, which he divided into two component parts-the "decision to prosecute" and the "decision to desist from prosecution." Id. at 387, 375 A.2d at 621 (emphasis deleted). When a determination not to proceed with prosecution is involved, as for example in a nolle pros, the
matter is subject to judicial review. Id. at 387-88, 375 A.2d at 621. Since there is an
affirmative duty on the prosecutor to prosecute, when he acts in this capacity, his decisions are subject to public scrutiny. However, when he fails to prosecute, since there is
no duty to desist from prosecution, virtually no opportunity for such scrutiny exists.
Therefore, the possibility for abuse is greater and public policy considerations justify
judicial review. See 73 N.J. at 388, 375 A.2d at 621.
Having concluded that the court has the authority to review prosecutorial decisions
concerning termination of criminal proceedings without trial, Judge Conford went on to
find that as an outgrowth of this authority, the court had the power to promulgate standards and guidelines governing such decisions. Id. According to Judge Conford, these
guidelines may be used by courts as a measuring standard when reviewing claims of
prosecutorial arbitrariness. Id. at 390, 375 A.2d at 622. In addition, "the formal existence
of such [guidelines] creates a species of new right on the part of the defendant," i.e.,
the right to apply and be considered for PTI. Id. at 391, 375 A.2d at 622-23. The existence of such a right assures fairness in treatment, which in turn is guaranteed by a
judicial review process. Id.; see Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 520-21, 341 A.2d 629,
642-43 (1975); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 246-48, 277 A.2d
193, 197-98 (1971).
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court, thereby, affirmed the validity of the PTI procedures and
guidelines established by that decision. Furthermore, the court expounded upon its original opinion by noting that while an individual
may not be denied consideration of his application for PTI solely on
the basis of his offense, it may be appropriate, under certain circumstances, to deny admittance solely on that basis.' 2 7 Thus, the court
recognized that once an examination of a defendant's background has
been made, the offense charged may still be the ultimate factor in a
decision denying entry into a program.
The Leonardis holdings, and similarly the guidelines, are premised upon the court's view that rehabilitation is the basis for pretrial
diversion. 12 8 However, it is important to consider, when analyzing
these decisions, that the state's power to impose penal restrictions is
premised upon the notion of culpability. 129 Diversionary strategies
are fundamentally preadjudication measures; 30 there is no determination of guilt or innocence.' 3 ' While the benefits of reforming
127 73

N.J. at 382, 375 A.2d at 618.

128 71 N.J. at 92-107, 363 A.2d at 324-32.
129 The PTI model de-emphasizes proving the offense and attempts to reconcile its

approach by claiming that the aim of the process "is to 'help' rather than to 'punish.' "
Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 226, 231 (1959). A critic of this approach has commented that "one may rightly
wonder as to the value of therapy purchased at the expense of justice." Id. In fact,
reports have shown that dispositions for control groups used in project evaluations were
often dismissals. Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798, supra note 42, at 145 (statement of
Daniel J. Freed).
130See CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 34, at 134; Addict Diversion, supra note
43, at 673; PretrialDiversion, supra note 32, at 827-28.
131A plea of guilty is not a prerequisite to diversion in New Jersey. Zaloom, supra
note 34, at 198; PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guideline 4. However, in certain
jurisdictions either an acknowledgment of responsibility or a guilty plea, is a condition
to participation.

NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, ABA COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, MONOGRAPH ON LEGAL ISSUES

AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 47 & n.8 (April 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MONOGRAPH ON LEGAL ISSUES]; Alford, Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition: The Newest Facet of the CriminalJustice System (The Allegheny County
Program), 13 DUQ. L. REV. 499, 512-13 (1975); Zaloom, supra at 198.
At hearings on federal pretrial legislation, the Assistant Attorney General of the
United States objected to the omission of a provision excluding "individuals who maintain their innocence," on the premise "that the individual must, in some way, recognize
his wrongful conduct before he can be successfully rehabilitated." Hearings on S. 798,
supra note 81, at 397 (statement of Mike McKevitt). This stance has since been described as "represent[ing] a penitential rather than a rehabilitative philosophy." Zaloom,
supra at 198. The propriety of a guilty plea requirement has been justified by comparing
it with the constitutionality of plea bargaining. A guilty plea entered to avoid a harsher
penalty has been held to be constitutionally permissible. North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Therefore, a guilty plea entered solely to enable one to participate in
a PTI program and thus avoid prosecution, should be constitutionally permissible as
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defendants are apparent, the sudden expansion of diversion, which
essentially contradicts the basic tenet of criminal law that one is innocent until proven guilty, is significant.
l3 2
The court, by emphasizing the rehabilitative objectives of PTI,
in essence, is supporting the theory that an individual's need for so33
cial assistance is of greater concern than a person's culpability.'
Furthermore, in stressing the primacy of rehabilitation, the court
overlooked, to a large extent, the equally important objective of
the "expeditious disposition" of criminal cases.1 34 Although the court
acknowledged that the efficient processing of criminal cases was "central to the PTI concept,"' 13 5 it in fact may be argued that this goal constituted the primary impetus to development of the diversionary
concept. 136
well. See generally id. (guilty plea entered to avoid more stringent punishment does
not constitute a coerced plea, especially where competent counsel so advised); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently
made, not rendered involuntary within the meaning of the fifth amendment when motivated by a desire to avoid death penalty). Countering the requirement of an admission
of guilt, or its equivalent, are constitutional arguments that such a prerequisite entails
a waiver of the defendant's fifth amendment protection "against self-incrimination, as
well as his rights to a trial by jury and to confrontation of witnesses." MONOGRAPH ON
LEGAL ISSUES, supra at 44-45 (footnote omitted); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242 (1969) (plea of guilty synonymous with confession, thus constituting waiver of fifth
amendment privilege). Similar arguments have been raised where restitution, as opposed to a guilty plea, is required in order to gain admittance into a PTI program.
6
MON GRAPH ON LEGAL ISSUES, supra at 61-63. In addition, it has been contended
that a restitutional requirement is violative of equal protection. See Alford, supra at 513.
132 71 N.J. at 96, 98-99, 363 A.2d at 326-28. Other attempted reforms in the criminal
justice system have also been predicated on a rehabilitative model, yet have engendered much criticism. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 41, at 204-09; Zaloom, supra note
34, at 179-80; Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798, supra note 42, at 149 (statement of
Daniel J. Freed).
One such court reform is indeterminate sentencing, which like the diversion system, "tailor[s] the punishment to fit the criminal rather than the crime." Comment,
supra at 207. The length of incarceration depends upon the amount of time needed for
rehabilitation of the individual, rather than upon the type of crime committed. Id. See
generally R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 222-24 (1970). The juvenile court system also
developed as an informal diversionary system, the dominant purpose of which was to
rehabilitate youthful offenders. Comment, supra at 204-05; Zaloom, supra at 179. The
Supreme Court, however, has invalidated much of juvenile court procedure, finding it
violative of due process guarantees. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358-61
(1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1-20 (1967).
133 See Comment, supra note 41, at 183. To a large extent, diversion strategies assume guilt. COURTS, supra note 33, at 33 (statement that "[d]iversion of an offender
assumes that some act justifying criminal intervention has occurred").
134 71 N.J. at 98 & n.8, 99-100, 112, 363 A.2d at 328, 329, 335. For discussion of the
purposes underlying PTI, see note 77 supra and accompanying text.
13571 N.J. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328.
136 Arguably, the primary impetus for diversion was not rehabilitation, but rather the
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The inability of courts to handle the ever increasing number of
criminal cases influenced authorities to seek alternative methods of
processing cases.' 3 7 This led to the adoption of formal diversionary
programs.' 3 8 It appears, however, that the use of these programs was
intended for situations where the traditional criminal process would
otherwise have produced harsh results. 13 9 The individuals to be diverted were not those who needed to be reformed, but rather those
for whom prosecution would serve no useful purpose and for whom
140
the effects of such prosecutions would in fact prove detrimental.
Although it may be contended that some of these individuals were in
need of assistance, it becomes clear that the primary purpose for such
programs was not the individual's rehabilitation. 141
The Leonardis I court has not only given the goal of efficiency in
court procedures a secondary role, but by its decision, it has concomitantly created an administrative backlog in PTI programs. 14 2 By
holding that the automatic exclusion of persons from PTI does not
further the rehabilitative aims of diversionary programs, the court, in
effect, has extended the opportunity for participation in PTI to all
fact that the rigid application of criminal justice procedures, at least with regard to certain individuals, resulted in harsh treatment. See Zaloom, supra note 34, at 179; Comment, supra note 41, at 180; Innovative Reform, supra note 32, at 1206. It was argued
that formal diversionary options would make the criminal justice system more efficient.
Klapmuts, Community Alternatives to Prison 305-10 (Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency 1973) (reprinted from CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE (June 1973)).
Hence, it appears that diversion was initially intended for persons charged with less
serious offenses. See COURTS, supra note 33, at 32. While some of these persons may
have been in need of some sort of assistance, the inappropriateness of prosecuting them
provided the initial impetus for diversion. See Hearings on H.R. 9007 S. 798, supra
note 42, at 144 (statement of Daniel J. Freed); COURTS, supra at 31; Brakel, supra note
30, at 212-13; Innovative Reform, supra at 1204; Pretrial Diversion, supra note 32, at
827-28.
137 For a discussion of the impetus for the implementation of such alternatives, see
notes 38-42 supra.
138 See COURTS, supra note 33, at 33.
139 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798, supra note 42, at 144 (statement of
Daniel J. Freed); COURTS, supra note 33, at 28; Comment, supra note 41, at 180. For an
outline of the bases for diversion, see notes 33-37 supra.
140 See COURTS,

141Id. at 30.
142

supra note 33, at 28, 32-33.

From January, 1976, through May, 1976, the Hudson County Pretrial Intervention

Project processed 454 applications.

HUDSON COUNTY PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROJECT, MONTHLY REPORTS (Jan.-May 1976) (available from Hudson County Pretrial Inter-

vention Project, Jersey City, N.J.). For the same months in 1977, the program handled
595 cases, an increase of approximately 31%. Id. (Jan.-May 1977). There have also been
at least 75 rejection hearings during the period from September, 1976, to July, 1977.
Telephone interview with Rita K. Douglas, Project Director, Hudson County Pretrial
Intervention Project (July 10, 1977).
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criminal defendants. 143 As a result, pretrial programs are overburdened with both applications and participants. 14 4 In addition, while
not formal evidentiary hearings, the pretrial rejection hearings mandated by Leonardis I are still time consuming and costly, resulting in
increased judicial responsibilities.' 4 5
An issue left unresolved in Leonardis I, although raised by both
the Leonardis and Rose appeals, is whether the PTI exclusionary
criteria constituted a discriminatory classification which infringed
upon equal protection rights.' 4 6 Classifications resulting in unequal
treatment may only be justified upon a showing by the state of a
rational basis for its action. 147

The precise issue of whether certain exclusionary criteria are related to a person's rehabilitative prospects was decided by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. United States. 148 The defendant in
Marshall was precluded, on the basis of a "two-prior felony exclu143 71

N.J. at 112, 363 A.2d at 335.
note 141 supra.
145 See 71 N.J. at 122, 363 A.2d at 340; PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93, Guideline
8. The court later imposed the rather onerous burden of demonstrating "arbitrary or
capricious" prosecutorial actions upon defendants, PTI GUIDELINES, supra Guideline 8,
thereby limiting the scope of review of the PTI rejection hearing. It perhaps would
have been more practical, in terms of judicial economy, to simply grant the judiciary the
discretion to decide whether a hearing was appropriate or inappropriate. For commentary on the PTI rejection hearings, see note 102 supra.
14'71 N.J. at 110-11, 113, 363 A.2d at 334-36.
Since the Leonardis I decision, two equal protection challenges concerning PTI
have been decided, each reaching opposite conclusions. See Irons v. Coleman, No.
L-1540-76 P.W., slip op. at 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (absence of PTI
program in a county not a denial of equal protection); State v. Kowitski, 145 N.J. Super.
237, 242-43, 367 A.2d 459, 461-62 (Law Div. 1976) (denying a person the opportunity of
PTI solely because the defendant allegedly committed a crime in a county without a
program found violative of equal protection guarantee).
147The equal protection doctrine provides that, where the discriminatory treatment
involves a suspect classification or a fundamental right, only a "compelling state interest" will justify the disparity. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 375 (1971)
(alienage, race and nationality are inherently suspect classifications and as such, must
be supported by a compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634,
638 (1969) (fundamental right to travel interstate cannot be infringed in the absence of a
compelling state interest). Distinctions in treatment not falling within those categories
need merely be supported by a finding of rationality as the basis for the state action.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (education
not a fundamental right, therefore public school financing plan need only be scrutinized
under rational basis test). Compare Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969) (discussion of the two-pronged equal protection
analysis) with Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972) (proposition that approach to equal protection cases may be taking on
different dimensions).
144 See

14- 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
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sion," 149 from receiving benefits under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA). 150 The Court upheld the program's exclusionary criteria, deeming it rational to conclude that one "who has committed two or more prior felonies . . . is likely to be less susceptible

of rehabilitation." 15 1 Since a certain "risk to society" is involved
when attempting to reform addicts in the community, it was not irrational to exclude certain offenders, even though the primary purpose
of the Act was rehabilitation. 15 2 Therefore, the mere possibility
149 Id.
150

Id.

at 420.
at 418-20. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) was enacted by

Congress in 1966. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80
Stat. 1438 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3411-3426 (1970)). Title I of the Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1970), applies to certain addicts charged with felonies, and provides for their rehabilitative commitment
prior to trial, with dismissal of charges upon completion of treatment. Title II, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4251-4255 (1970), contains similar provisions for those convicted of a federal offense.
Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3411-3426 (1970), concerns addicts seeking treatment who are
not involved with the criminal court system. Congress had a two-fold purpose in adopting the exclusionary provisions of the Act; "first, to exclude from NARA treatment those
less likely to be rehabilitated . . . , and second, to exclude those whose records disclosed a 'history of serious crimes.' " 414 U.S. at 425.
151 414 U.S. at 425. The specific issue-whether the commission of violent crime is
rationally related to a person's potential for rehabilitation-has been decided affirmatively in the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Krehbiel, 493 F.2d 497, 497-98 (9th Cir.
1974) (relying on Marshall, NARA exclusions of defendants charged with violent crimes
not a denial of equal protection).
Prior to Marshall, circuit courts had differed concerning the constitutionality of the
NARA exclusion of applicants having two prior felony convictions. See, e.g., United
States v. Bishop, 469 F.2d 1337, 1346 (1st Cir. 1972) (NARA two-felony exclusion held
unconstitutional on grounds that it "lack[ed] relevance to the purpose for which [it was]
enacted"); United States v. Hamilton, 462 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (NARA
two-felony exclusion held unconstitutional even where felonies not drug-related); Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1972) (NARA two-felony exclusion held constitutional).
152 414 U.S. at 429-30; see COURTS, supra note 33, at 74. Attempting to reform addicts while they are in the community, as opposed to while they are incarcerated, represents a rather novel approach to drug rehabilitation. See id. at 426. Because of its
experimental nature, this type of approach entails a certain degree of risk for society at
large. Id. at 429-30. There is less of a deterrent effect operating on the drug offenders as
well as a lessened degree of supervision over them. See id.
The PTI model, also considered experimental, is predicated on a similar type of
approach as that used under NARA, i.e., offenders remain in the community while they
participate in a rehabilitative program with limited supervision. It would, therefore, appear that the risks observed in the NARA drug rehabilitation method are present in PTI
as well.
Despite these risks, the New Jersey legislature, by enactment of the New Jersey
Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, has also endorsed a pretrial intervention concept
for dealing with drug offenders. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-1 to -45 (West Cum. Supp.
1977-1978). This statutory provision authorizes the suspension of court proceedings for
first-time drug offenders, who are then expected to fulfill certain conditions of supervisory treatment. As with pretrial intervention, once the accused has complied with the
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that some persons who might have been rehabilitated under the Act
were precluded from treatment did not render the exclusion impermis53
sibly discriminatory.'
By following a Marshall-type rationale, the Leonardis I court
could have concluded that the exclusion from PTI of those charged
with heinous offenses is a valid classification. Although the Leonardis
case differs from Marshall in that the Leonardis exclusion was based
on the type of offense committed rather than upon the degree of
involvement with the criminal system,' 54 it would still seem logical to
conclude that persons committing certain serious offenses are less
likely to be reformed.' 5 5 Furthermore, society has an interest in its
own self-protection which may seek rational expression through a desire to incarcerate and deter certain offenders, rather than through an
attempt to rehabilitate them. Therefore, a finding that the interests of
society outweigh the interests of the excluded offender is clearly supportable, even in light of the underlying rehabilitative purpose of
PTI.156

With the elimination of restrictive admissions policies in county
PTI programs, the Leonardis I court has placed added emphasis on
the role of PTI in New Jersey's criminal justice system. In conjunction with this expansion of PTI, the court, cognizant of the largely
terms of treatment, the charges are dismissed "without [a] court adjudication of guilt."
Id. § 24:21-27(b). This disposition is not considered a conviction in the event of subsequent court appearances. Id. Application of the statutory provision is discretionary, in
that the statute cannot be invoked where the defendant is deemed to be "a danger to
the community" or where the available supervisory services are insufficient to guarantee public security. Id. § 24:21-27(c)(1)(2).
Recently, the supreme court broadly construed the statute as being applicable to a
defendant regardless of whether that person was actually a user of drugs. State v. Alston, 71 N.J. 1, 5-6, 362 A.2d 545, 547 (1976). Immediately following Alston, in the case
of State v. Sayko, 71 N.J. 8, 362 A.2d 549 (1976), the court discussed the degree of
"discretion vested in a trial court" with regard to the granting of a suspension under the
statute. Id. at 12, 362 A.2d at 551. Justice Sullivan, while acknowledging that judges
have much latitude in making their decisions, advised that "the whole person concept"
be utilized. Id. at 13, 362 A.2d at 552. For a definition of the "whole person concept,"
see note 95 supra. See generally State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 566-67, 303 A.2d 312,
322-23 (1973).
153414 U.S. at 427-28. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated "that
the classification selected by Congress is not one which is directed 'against' any individual or category of persons, but rather it represents a policy choice." Id. at 428. The
legislature did not intend that all addicts, by virtue of their addiction, would be included within the purview of the Act. Id. at 423. Congress reasoned that persons who
have demonstrated anti-social behavior in the past would not only be unresponsive to
treatment but might also disrupt the reformation of others. Id. at 425.
154Compare 71 N.J. at 90-91, 363 A.2d at 323-24 with 414 U.S. at 418.
155 For cases dealing with exclusionary criteria, see note 150 supra.
156 See 414 U.S. 427-28; note 151 supra and accompanying text.
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unregulated network of programs in the state, 157 has established procedural guidelines to guarantee a modicum of fairness in the implementation of these programs. 158 While the court did not specifically refer to the concept of due process, by requiring prosecutors to
provide a written statement of reasons and a hearing to defendants
where admission to PTI is denied, the fundamental concepts of notice
and opportunity to be heard have been incorporated into PTI procedures. Additionally, the court's provision for judicial review of PTI
matters, as well as its promulgation of guidelines, 159 will insure a
needed degree of uniformity and predictability for the PTI decisionmaking process.
Although the Leonardis I decision has withstood the challenge
that it was violative of the separation of powers doctrine, 16 0 it is still
questionable whether PTI will remain a viable concept in New Jersey. For despite reforms, the ultimate success of PTI must still be
determined in light of the number of offenders actually rehabilitated. 16 In view of the fact that no investigation was made as to
71 N.J. at 120-21, 363 A.2d at 340.
158 See id. at 122, 363 A.2d at 340-41.
159 Id. at 119-22, 363 A.2d at 339-41; PTI GUIDELINES, supra note 93. In discussing
the need for judicial review of PTI decision-making procedures, the court analogized to
administrative agencies. 71 N.J. at 115-16, 363 A.2d at 337-39. This approach resulted
in the same conclusion-that judicial review was appropriate. Id. at 116, 363 A.2d at
337. The court's analysis, however, contained several references to cases where procedural protections were required on due process grounds, often under circumstances
much like that of PTI. See id. at 116, 363 A.2d at 337. Some of the cases cited by the
court are: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 791 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 518-24, 341 A.2d 629,
641-45 (1975).
180 73 N.J. at 367, 375 A.2d at 610-11.
161 While pretrial programs have been viewed as generally successful, PTI STRATEGIES, supra note 32, at 5-6, a few commentators have expressed doubts as to the
validity of such a conception. E.g., Zimring, Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Diversion
from the Criminal Justice System, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1974). In his article, Professor Zimring challenges the methods of evaluations used by various pretrial intervention
programs. Id. at 228-35. He suggests that many statistics issued by such programs are
misleading and, at best, inaccurate. See id. at 241. Although Professor Zimring acknowledged that diversion programs "are probably a healthy reform in the ... criminal justice" system, he cautioned that, because of the paucity of reliable statistical data, "they
are also oversold and widely misconceived." Id. at 241.
Professor Freed, also a critic of the diversion model, stated his opposition to federal
pretrial legislation. Hearings on H.R. 9007 and S. 798, supra note 42, at 144-57 (statement of Daniel J. Freed). He remarked that, despite "notable accomplishments" of early
diversion programs, id. at 144, there are yet insufficient findings to warrant the establishment of permanent federal PTI programs, id. at 145. In conclusion, Professor Freed
cautioned that "[t]here is too much experience with reforms which have failed." Id.
157
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whether PTI was capable of reforming defendants convicted of all
types of crimes, perhaps a more pragmatic approach for the court to
adopt would have been to limit PTI availability to a defined category
of offenders until further evidence on PTI's effectiveness could be
presented. If PTI fails to achieve its objectives, it will be reduced to
a mere mechanical system for processing defendants, the effect of
which will be to produce judicial condonation of dismissals without
either an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or his rehabilitation.
Joyce M. Calefati

